While the traditional federal acquisition process can be slow and cumbersome, there are several mechanisms and approaches that can expedite the approval and funding of prototype systems. These alternative pathways can enable rapid acquisition and help accelerate the development and deployment of new technologies for various government agencies. Some of these mechanisms include:

The Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) pathway is a streamlined and agile procurement process implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to accelerate the delivery of advanced military capabilities. Established in response to the rapidly evolving technological landscape and the need for quicker adaptation, the MTA pathway serves as an alternative to traditional acquisition processes. This summary provides a brief history of the MTA pathway and its development within the DoD.

The Military Urgent Operational Needs (UON) and Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) program is a procurement initiative utilized by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to quickly acquire critical technologies, capabilities, and systems to address urgent and unforeseen operational needs in the field. This essay will explore the concept, history, and use cases of the UON and JUON program.

In the long list of highly important and useful tools within the RDT&E toolbox, the one that is by far the most impactful, been around the longest, and is still heavily utilized to this day is the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). As it is organized through and by the command staff levels of the COCOMs and higher levels of the military, most tactical and operational levels of the military don't see or interact with these events. As such, most "innovation" personnel are very unfamiliar with the JCTD process, and often in the pursuit of technologies from the tactical edge fail to consider this option in R&D planning.

It is a very common issue in the R&D space, especially when working with small companies, that the government is pitched a "technology" or "solution". The core issue with this approach is that it is fundamentally flawed from the start. The government acquisition system does not build things it buys end products. The government has to buy products (usually a complete system) to fill a requirement, and not components for systems no matter how cool, useful, or ground breaking a technology it might be. It is the role of industry to take our need, and figure out a way to make their technology into a product, that then can by purchased by the government to address that original need.

In the final installment in of my three part article series providing a more in depth look at the Innovation acquisition system, let us now turn to the most mysterious and hard to answer question for outsiders of “who do I talk to?” To answer this question it is first key to understand the organizations involved and their primary function either in or related to acquisition. The title graphic above shows the layout of major organizations that have required roles in this overall process. The ever elusive needs, requirements, and funding decisions are all made at the Combatant Command (COCOM) and Major Command (MAJCOM) level. The outcomes of those decisions are then acted upon for R&D or Acquisition by internal or external organizations depending on the size of the effort, with large efforts going external and small ones staying internal to the commands. Every command staff serving both COCOMs and MAJCOMs have statutory functions they must provide, and therefore have similar but varying structures and even these change over time. Understanding these structures is the key to figuring out who to talk to for any major decision in the acquisition process.

I like to think of this infographic as the most valuable piece of information that I have ever received during my time working in the innovation ecosystem. Ironic that I received this during a HAF/A5R training course, rather than from any innovation training or organization. I also think that says a lot out the internal disconnects between innovation and acquisition in general. The critical point to remember is that until that hypothetical future day comes where laws are past or regulations are changed, we have the acquisition we have. The question for today should be then, how do we work within that system and integrate our new innovation initiatives. To accomplish that we have to start with the understanding of what options are available and how do they conceptually work. To that end, I present the most valuable piece of information to illustrating that answer.

The total numbers aside, it is the percentages of each funding type (color) and the relative ratio of each funding type to each other that forces certain limitations to innovation planning. First of the five funding types, only three are of any possible use to innovation acquisition, and they are each of drastically reduced availability for innovation use. In order, RDT&E then O&M then Procurement are probably, possible, then plausible for innovation acquisition. It is important to also remember that each of those funding type all have an ever increasing amount of the funding already spoken for by existing needs and requirements. Innovation is always a sliver of the any funding type available.

The traditional acquisition landscape and process can be long and complicated. Much like foreign explorers staring up at the hieroglyphics covered walls in ancient Egyptian temples, the ability for non-native people to understand the nonsensical language and complex orchestration of the acquisition system can be daunting without months of training and years of experience. To help crack the code, and expedite the learning curve, I recommend starting with the three items that can form the Rosetta Stone for Acquisition.